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I. Introduction 
In two recent papers in this JOURNAL, Chichilnisky (1980,1981) has 
argued that, in.the context of models and under conditions stated by her, a 
transfer of resources from the North to the South is immiserizing to the 
South; and that increase in demand by the North of the South's exportable 
good will be inuniserizing to the South, as well. 
These assertions are utilised by the author to deduce policy con­
clusions concerning North-South trade relations, the optimal trade strategy 
for the South, and the question of the advisability of foreign aid. These 
are matters of considerable concern at the present juncture. It is essential 
therefore to examine the logical validity of these claims. 
Both the subjects of immi.serzing transfers and immiserizing growth are, 
of course, well understood by the students of international trade theory and 
statements of the conditions under which such "paradoxical" phenomena 
can be arrived at in specific models are readily available in that literature.I/ 
What we show here, however, is that such phenomena are derived incorrectly in 
the Chichilniskypapers; and that her results simply do not follow from the 
assumptions as stated by her. We do this by examining the Chichilnisky treat­
ment of the transferproblem in Section 2, and her handling of the growth 
problem in Section 3. In view of the essential simplicity of the Chichilnisky 
models, it should be both sufficient and illuminating to utilise the simple 
geometric methods of trade theory to demonstrate, as we do, the mistakes in 
Chichilnisky. However, the Appendix provides a simple formal algebraic 
treatment of the Chichilnisky models and deduces the correct results. 
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II. Immiserizing Transfers from Abroad: 
In Chichilnisky (1980), a simple exchange model with fixed coefficients 
in consumption is used. It is a socalled North-South model, with the North 
differentiated into Rich and Poor groups,.and the South kept homogeneous; 
she endows each group with fixed quantities of 2 goods, A and B, and with 
fixed consumption coefficients. Besides, the South spends a larger proportion 
of income than the Poor on B goods whereas the latter, in turn, spend a greater 
proportion on B goods than their Rich compatriots. With the Rich transferring 
A goods to the South, the following theorem is stated (1980, p. 510): 
Theorem 1: Assume that the endowments of the South are small, con­
sisting mostly of basic goods Band that conditions (C.l) and (C.2)
are satisfied. 
Then a transfer of the luxury or investment good A.from the resources
of the high income group in the North to the South will necessarily
decrease the welfare of the South and increase the welfare of the
North, in a (Walrasian) stable market.JJ 
Unfortunately, this cannot be correct: and the error is immediately evident. 
Thus, take Figure 1, where the South is represented. Let be the endowment.E1 
Then, p
1 
is the initial price ratio, c
1 
the consumption point so that South 
exports B goods and Us the social welfare for (homogeneous) South. Fixed 
coefficients in consumption are shown. Let South new receive A goods of 
amount E1E2 • Now, as in standard Samuelsonian 2-state argumentation, we can 
deduce a rise in excess demand for B goods in the world markets as a result 
of the transfer, at constant terms of trade, if the Rich spend a lower pro­
portion of income on B goods than South does, as assumed by the author (1980, 









B goods must rise: pl yields to p
2
• Under these assumptions, which are 
totally consistent with the stated assumptions of Chichilnisky prior to, and 
including in (Theorem 1) paragraph 2, we have welfare improvement for the 
South; and hence the assertion that the transfer will necessarily decrease 
the welfare of the South is evidently invalid. 
It is equally evident that we could show inuniserization by assuming in 
Figure 1 that the South was exporting A goods rather than B goods: such that c
1 
was replaced in Figure 1 by c•1 (and a suitable shift in p2}. But then we have 
to reckon with the author's added assumption, in Theorem 1, paragraph 1, that "the 
endowments of the South are small, consisting mostly of basic goods B." If the 
endowment is sufficiently large in B goods and negligible in A goods, as is 
consistent with the assumption made, then the implied trade pattern initially 
would be definitely at a point such as c with B goods being exported initially.1 
In that case, welfare improvement of the South (rather than its immiserization} 
4/
must follow!-
III. Immiserizing Growth: 
The claims in Clnj.chilnisky(1981} are unfortunately no more valid than 
those in Chichilnisky(1980). Before we discuss the model itself, we need to 
reproduce some of the author's statements in regard to the theory of 
immiserizing growth in Bhagwati (1958) (1968) s 
"our results also differ both in assumptions and in policy conclusions 
from others in the existing formalised trade and growth literature on the 
immiserising effects of growth [cf. Bhagwati (1968, 1972)), Mundell (1968}].
In those works the results emerge from assumptions on int9rnational markets 
such as, for instance, different international elasticities of demand for 
the goods in which the North and the South specialise: the exports of the 
South are assumed to have inelastic demand internationally while the exports
o_f the North have more elastic demands. Therefore, as the South attempts 
to grow more than the North, the prices of the exports of the South fall 
significantly, thus undermining its growth efforts ••• 
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The results in this paper have a dual character with respect to those ofBhagwati (1968, 1972), since ours depend more on the behaviour of supplyof factors of production rather than on the elasticity of demand forgoods. 
(1981, p. 182) 
It must be stated thatOiichilnisky errs in regard to what Bhagwati (1958)
showed as a condition for inmiseriz.inggrowth in a country. He demonstrated that
either an inelastic foreign offer curve,,£;: ultra-biased growth with negative
output-elasticity of supply of the importable good when the foreign offer curve
is elastic, would make inuniserizing growth possible. It is simply wrong to
assert therefore that an inelastic foreign offer curve is necessary for
immiserizing growth to occur in the Bhagwati case. The asserted "dual" character
fo Bhagwati's theorem with that apparently proved in Chichilnisky(l981), with
the former depending on inelastic demand and the latter on factor supply, is
thus incorrect. 
But, apart from this error, there is also no appreciation of the fact that
Bhagwati was dealing with domestic, exogenously-specified growth that 
immiserized the growing country. To explore imiserizing growth in her model,
Chichilnisky would have to solve for the effect of expansion that is both domestic
and exogenous, either due to technical change or due to capital accumulation,
on domestic welfare: the way it is done, and needs to be done, in Bhagwati (1958)
(1968) et al. This, she does not do. 
Instead, as she is concerned with the effects on the South of assumed "shifts
in the demand of the North" (1981, p. 178; footnote 11), she should be concerned 
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with the very different issue as to whether growth (or other parametric or 
policy shift) elsewhere can immiserize a country. And of course, it should 
come as no surprise that growth (or other shift) may imply an adverse shift 
in the foreign offer curve facing a country and therefore the country loses 
some of the gains from trade and is immiserized relative to the situation 
prior to this external growth (or other shift). 
Unfortunately, however, even this analysis is erroneous in Chichilnisky 
(1981) becatSe it is fatally flawed, as is the bulk of the paper, by the false 
argument that, in the model specified by her, an increase in the demand for 
the exportable (at each price) would reduce, rather than increase, the price 
of the exportable: 
"OUr case reflects, instead, shifts in the demand of the North, thatincrease the demand for the exportable at each price. This would undertraditional assumptions increase the price of the exportable. In ourcase just the opposite effect takes place."(1981 , p. 178 , footnote 11) 
The rest of this Section is therefore devoted to showing very simply using 
a geometric technique developed by Ronald Findlay, that this central proposition 
cannot hold in the model as specified by her; that, in fact, the model is 
extremely well-behaved indeed in this regard.2/ The model is, in essence, a 
2x2x2 model with two points to note: the production functions are characterized 
by fixed coefficients, and the supplies of factors are variable with respect 
to rewards, in each country. Let the factors be Kand L, and the goods be I 
and B. Then, the following holds for each of the 2 countries. In any in­
completely specialized production equilibrium the goods price (PI/PB) 
7 
determines the factor price ratio (w/r) through the usual zero profit 
conditions under pure competition and constant returns to scale in production. 
These in turn determine factor quantities (Kand L) through the postulated 
relationships between factor supplies and real factor rewards. Finally, 
given the factor supplies, outputs of I (QI) and B (QB) are determined 
using the condition that factors are fully employed. 
Now, let PI/PB increase. We can then see that, if I is the K-intensive 
good, w/r falls, therefore K increases and L falls. Therefore, as in the 
argument underlying Rybczynski theorem, QI increases and QB falls. Therefore, 
given Walras' Law so that we concentrate on the I market, we see in Figure 2 
that QI is a monotonically increasing function of PI/PB. As for demand for I, 
this is assumed constant. Therefore DI is a vertical line. Now, add both 
A Acountries to get aggregate DI, QI curves, as in Figure 3. 
One could not therefore get a stronger result; the equilibrium is unique 
and evidently Walras-stable. Now consider the North to have an increased demand 
for South's exportable good B, as in Chichilnisky. This is equivalent to the 
D~ curve shifting to the left to We then get the orthodox conclusion that 
P
1
/PB must decrease with increased demand for the B good. Unfortunately, 
therefore, the Chichilnisky assertion to the contrary must be quietly buried. 
And, since this assertion is central to her paper, we must necessarily reject 




( Demand 0:r 





A' I DID:I I( World Demand 
for :I aft_er ...:<::-- I oA 
illcreasea -1: 
a-Demand ( World Supply
in North) 
of :I) 




1. Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grant No. SCS-8-25401 
for support of Bhagwati's research underlying this paper. Conversations 
with Richard Brecher, Ronald Findlay, Tatsuo Hatta, Neantro Saavedra, 
and Pablo Serra have been very helpful. 
2. To say that such paradoxes have been demonstrated - e.g. Bhagwati (1958, 
1968) on innniserizing growth; Leontief (1936 ), Samuelson (1947, 1952 ), 
Brecher and Bhagwati (1981a, 1981b) on innniserizing transfers from abroad -
is no~ to say that they are likely. Some of these results may be equally 
interpretated as showing the improbability of the paradoxical outcomes 
arising because of the conditions established for their occurrence. 
3. Condition C.1 and C.2 ensure that an equilibrium exists with a positive 
price for basic goods and that equilibrium prices vary continuously 
with the parameters of the model. 
4. If we were to assume, however, that the South was exporting A goods, the 
interesting question, of course, is whether we would then be able to show 
the South's innniserization, consistent with Walrasian stability. The answer 
to this question is that, yes, it is possible to show this in a 3-agent model 
even though, in the 2-agent Leontief (1936)-Samuelson (1947,1952)analysis, 
we know that Walrasian instability is required for the transferee to be 
innniserized. This proposition,developed in Brecher-Bhagwati (1981a) at 
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length and with conditions for immiserization carefully and simply spelled 
out, is easily understood in its essence as follows. Thus, recall the 
2-country Samuelson-Mundell (1960) criterion for the welfare impact on the 
transferee: This is: 
auII mI + mII ... l




£I + £II _ l 
where the transferor is country I, the transferee is country II, m1 and mII are 
the marginal propensities to spend on importables (in a 2.-good setting) and 
£I, £II are the compensated offer curve elasticities. Since e:'I and £'·II are 
duII > o' i'f £I+ ~IIdefinitely signed . under the usual assumptions, dT c.. > 1, i.e.-
if market stability is assumed. The transfe~ee cannot be imrniserized. 
When, however, an "outside" country or agent is assumed, say country III, 
which neither makes nn.,... ,...~,...,=d ~7 oc the transfer, t,,.11en the formula rrru.st clearly be 
modified to take this into account. The income terms in the numerator will now 
belong only to the transferor I and the transferee II, whereas the offer curve 
elasticity e:II must now be a weighted sum of the offer curve elasticities of 
auIIcountries II and III. Therefore will no longer show now simply the COIT\-·QT 
pensated elasticity tenns in the numerato~1 and, depending on the relative patterns 
of trade of countries II and III, as also their respective marginal propensities 
to import, the immiserization of country II can arise, even though Walrasian 
stability obtains. 
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5. We are indebted to Ronald Findlay who demonstrated clearly the well­
behaved nature of the Chichilnisky model and hence the error of her 
contrary assertions, by producing the simple argumentation we have 
used in the next. This error and several other problems afflictini 
the details of the Chichilnisky analysis, have been noted by Neantro 
Saavedra (1981) in a thorough comment. 
6. We may stress that this is not to say that, in policymaking, we need not 
worry about possibilities of adverse outcomes for recipients of transfers 
such as foreign aid, for example. Not merely have trade theorists, for 
instance, produced interesting cases of such adverse outcomes, as we noted 
in footnote 2, using conventional value-theoretic general-equilibrium 
models, but also there is a substantial theoretical literature on 
issues such as the possibly deleterious effects of foreign aid via reduced 
domestic savings and domestic agricultural performance, and via de­
stabilization efforts made possible through "aid-dependence," with some 
of this literature to be found in this JOURNAL itself (e.g. 1975, pp. 85-98) 
12 
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APPENDIX 
(A) The Transfer Problem 
Consider a country with the following Samuelsonian social utility function: 
F(B,A) = Min [B, AA] , A> 0 (1) 
and an endowment (EB, EA) of the two goods A and B. Then its excess 
demands (DB, DA) could be easily shown to be (with PA, PB as the price per 
unit of good A and B respectively in an accounting unit): 
For (PA= o, PB> 10) DB = 0 DA-> T EB - EA (2a) 
PA(AEA - EB) PB(EB - >.EA)
" (PA. > O, PB> 0) D = , D = (2b)B PA+ >.PB A PA+ >.PB 
" (PA > O, PB · =0) DB,?_ AEA - EB , D = 0 (2c)A 
Now the indirect utility function that 
corresponds to the direct utility function F(B, A) is given by: 
A
for PB >O, P = 0 (3a) 
(3b) 
(3c) 
Now npting that in Chichilnisky(l980): for H, A = 1 for L, 
and A= c for S (ii) c > l > ! (iii) H makes a transfer of TA units 
of A and TB units of B to S we get (denoting by E~ the net of 
J 





W W A BThe world excess demands D and D are (for P -= O, P > 0):A B 
Dw > a (H_ - T ) + LA -13 + Les + T ) - (H - TA + LA + SA + TA ) (Sa)B B c B B A 
DW = O
B (Sb) 
Hence if < 0 (Sc)
s:: 
..• 
then PA-= O, PB> O for any PB> 0 is a possible equilibrium price vector. 
Obviously, one can then choose good Bas numeraire 
Band set P = 1. Since 
(Sc) does not involve TA, if it holds for some TB' it continues to hold 
as TA is varied keepinE? TB fixed. Hence changes in TA do not affect 
equilibrium prices or welfare. From (3a) it can be easily shown that (as 
long as (5c) holds so that as TB is varied equilibrium prices remain at 
II: -1, - o, so that the rich in the 
Norrn 1ose and Sourh gains by an increase in the transfer TB. 




Hence if 0 (6c) 
A3 
then p
A >O, PB O for anyc is a possible equilibrium price vector. 
Awe can choose good A as nu~raire and set P = 1. In this case, changes in TB 
With TA fixed, do not affect (6c) and hence the equilibrium. As long as 
(6c), holds while we vary dGH 1 dGL dGSTA, we get using (3c) that -- e - -




Hence, once again the rich in the North lose and South gains by an increas~ in TA._ 
Let us now consider equilibria in which PA> 0 and PB> 0 so that 
PB[HB - TB - a
l 




PA[c(SA + TA) - (SB+ TB)]+------------
PA+ cPB 
B PASetting P = l, defining P = - and using Wal"ras' law, the equilibriumPB 
P is obtained from 
D: (P) =p [HA - TA) - a(¾ - TB)]+ P(LA - LB)
,aP + l P + l 
~fc(SA + TA) - (SB+ TB)]
+ . p + C I: 0 (8) 
'aDW
B - p PcNow +




= -aP+l P+c > 0 since C a > 1 (10) 
A4 
* Hence if > 0 at an equilibrium P (i.e. if the equilibrium is 




anw)aP ~-D~ < 0 (11) 
aTA apB P=P*aTA 
ap * anw~ < (12)- (•n~ ~ * 0 aTB aTB ap jP=P 
Hence an increase in transfers of either kind unambiguouslyreduce the equilibrium 
~elative price of the A good. 
Using (3b) we r.et: 
* .* [(H - T) - a(~ - TB)] 3PaGll -P A A 
= + (13)
3TA (aP*+l) -!TA(aP* + 1/ 
·* [ (HA ;- TA) -a(HB - TB)] .~GH -1 aP (14)
=· + ·-- (aP*+l) aTBaTB (a.PX+ 1)2 
Now (HA - TA) - a(~ - TB) has the same sign as the excess demand for good 
"n* 
B by H • Since ;; < 0 and 0, a sufficient thou~h not necessary 
A 
con~itiou for both types of transfers to reduce the welfare of li unawbiruously 
is that H is a net demander of basic goods. This is intuitively obvious 
also, since transfers raise the price of basic goods relative to luxuries 
and at unchanged prices, they reduce the expenditure of H. Hence, if H 
is a net demander of basic goods, both effects work with same direction 
to reduce welfare. Now, 
AS 
acL LA - LB 3p*
= ·-- (15)3TA (P* + 1>2 3TA 
3GL LA - LB ap*
= (16)-3TB (P* + 1) 2 oTB 
Since L neither makes nor receives a transfer, its welfare is affected 
soJely due to the change in equilibrium prices. As such it is maie better 
(worse) off according as it is a net supplier(demander)of B goods i.e. 
according as LA - LB<(>) O. Now, 
cP* {~(SA+ TA) - (SB+ TB)} aP*




Hence S unambiguously benefits from either kind of transfer as 
long as he is a net supplier of B goods even after the transfers i.e. 
as long as c(SA + TA) - (SB+ TB) < 0. In particular, if South's 
endowment (inclusive of transfer) of non-basic goods is small relative to 
its endowment (inclusive of transfer) of basic goods, it must necessarily 
gain by transfers. 
It can be shown however that given ca> 1, in an equilibrium with 
PA> 0, PB> 0. LB~ LA implies c(SA +TA)> (SB+ TB) so that Northern 
poor and thetSouth cannot both be net suppliers of B ~oods. 
(B) Terms of Trade Problems 
Following Chichilnisky (1981) let us denote the production functions 
for the South as: 
A6 
LB KB (19a)B = Min[- , ]
al cl 
I 
I = Min[-1._ , -] 
KI (19b) 
al cl 
with D = > 0 •alc2 - a2cl 
Denoting by W the wage rate, P the price of good B and R 
B 
the rental rate on capital (all in terms of the I good as num~raire)· the 
aggregate factor supply functions are: 
L = a(p)w + L (20a) 
B 
K = BR+ K (20b) 
In any incompletely specialized production equilibrium profit 
maximization at positive and finite levels of output requires: 
p = (21a)B 
1 = (21b) 
Equation (21b) is the factor-price frontier of this model. We can rewrite 




Clearly, with D > O, c > O, a > 0, a rise in PB increases
1 2 
W and reduces R if the production equilibrium continues to be imcompletely 
wspecialized. Also (p) , the real wage in terms of good B, also increases 
B 
which in turn means (because of 20a and 20b) that a rise in PB increases 
aggregate supply of labour and reduces aggregate supply of capital. 
Now, given Chichilnisky's assumption that factor markets always clear, 
the outputs 
S S
B, I of the South given 
B















is an increasing function of P
B 
and is a decreasing 
function of PB, B5 (PB) is an increasing function of PB and IS(P~) is a 
decreasing dunction of PB. As such, given an exogenously specified demand 
I for good I, if the economy is closed, equilibrium P
B is unique 
provided it exists (i.e. I is a feasible demand). Chichilnisky states that 
there are two possible equilibrium PB values for a given I. This is 
plainly wrong: either there is none or there is only one. 
Now in a trading equilibrium, if we denote the aggregate demand for 
B
South's output of B goods as QDB(P ,9) representing the sum of domestic 
demand QS(PB) and North's excess demand for South's exports i.e. ~(PB, 9)
D 




Walrasian stability requires 
Hence, if there is a favourable shift in North's demand for South's exports 
d W 
> 0 o. This in term means that ~(B) > 0 as 
p 
well, that is the real wages in the South in term of basic goods goes up 
as well. 
